Firm performance and managerial turnover: the case of Ukraine by Bilyk, Ol'ga et al.
Economics Education and Research Consortium
Working Paper Series
          No 09/04
Firm Performance and Managerial Turnover: 
The Case of Ukraine
Olga Bilyk
 Bogdana Grechaniuk
Alexander Muravyev
This project (No. 07-0831) was supported
by the Economics Education and Research Consortium
All opinions expressed here are those of the authors
and not those of the Economics Education and Research Consortium
Research area: Enterprises and project markets
1
JEL classification: G34, J40, L29.
Bilyk O.,  Grechaniuk B.  and Muravyev A.  Firm Performance and Managerial 
Turnover: The Case of Ukraine. – Kyiv: EERC, 2009.
The paper studies whether and how CEO turnover in Ukrainian firms is related to their 
performance.  Based on a novel dataset  covering Ukrainian joint stock companies in 
2002-2006, the paper finds statistically significant negative association between the past 
performance  of  firms  measured  by  return  on  sales  and  return  on  assets,  and  the 
likelihood  of  managerial  turnover.  While  the  strength  of  the  turnover-performance 
relationship does not  seem to depend on factors such as managerial  ownership and 
supervisory board size,  we do find significant entrenchments effects associated with 
ownership by managers.  Overall,  our analysis  suggests that corporate governance in 
Ukraine operates with a certain degree of efficiency, despite the well-known lacunas in 
the country’s institutional environment. Our results are of particular interest in view of 
the ongoing changes in Ukrainian corporate law, and in particular, the recent enactment 
of Law on Joint-Stock Companies.
Acknowledgements.  Financial  support  by  the  Economics  Education  and  Research 
Consortium (EERC) is gratefully acknowledged (EERC Grant No. R07-0832). We are 
also  grateful  to  the  EERC experts  as  well  as  participants  of  Summer  2007  EERC 
Research  Workshop  and  Summer  2008  EERC  Research  Workshop  for  helpful 
comments and suggestions. Our special thanks are addressed to Russell Pittman, David 
Brown, Oleksandr Talavera, and Yulia Rodionova. The usual caveat applies. 
Keywords: corporate governance, managerial labor market, transition, Ukraine.
Olga Bilyk
Kyiv School of Economics
Sheptytskoho str., 11/77, Novyi Rozdil, Lviv region, 81652, Ukraine
Phone: +38 (097) 700 67 04
E-mail: obilyk@eerc.kiev.ua
Bogdana Grechaniuk
Kyiv School of Economics
Voiniv-Internatsionalistiv str., 4/116, Lutsk, 43000, Ukraine
Phone: +38 (050) 573 41 18
E-mail: bgrechaniuk@eerc.kiev.ua
Alexander Muravyev
IZA, DIW Berlin, and St. Petersburg University Graduate School of Management
Institute for the Study of Labor, P.O. Box 7240, 53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 (228) 3894-412
Fax: +49 (228) 3894-510
E-mail: muravyev@iza.org
2
Content
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………
..4
2. Literature review……………………………………………………………….7
3. Data  and  sample  description…………………………………………………
.11
4. Methodology
4.1. Performance measures…………………………………………………...14
4.2. Econometric models……………………………………………………...16
5. Regression results
5.1. Logit model………………………………………………………………..19
5.2. Survival analysis………………………………………………………….24
6. Conclusions………………………………………………………………….....26
7. Tables…………………………………………………………………………..29
8. References……………………………………………………………………...36
3
1. Introduction
When economic transformation started in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, the initial 
focus  of  both  academics  and  policy-makers  was  on  macro-issues,  such  as 
macroeconomic  stabilization,  liberalization  of  prices  and  foreign  trade,  as  well  as 
privatization  –  a  standard  set  of  Washington  consensus  reforms.  After  less  than  a 
decade, there was a remarkable shift in attention from this initial agenda to the need of 
filling in institutional gaps inherited by transition countries from the era of socialism 
(e.g.,  Mitra  et  al.,  2008).  In  particular,  there  was a  growing understanding that  the 
success  of  the  economic  reform  on  the  micro-level  would  to  a  large  extent  be 
determined by the emergence of effective institutions of corporate governance, which 
would  promote  restructuring  of  formerly  state-owned  enterprises,  eventually 
contributing to their improved performance (e.g., Dyck, 2001).
As  in  developed  market  economies,  corporate  governance  problems  facing 
transition  countries  stem  from  the  separation  of  ownership  and  control  and  the 
divergence  of  interests  of  principals  (shareholders)  and  agents  (managers).  In  the 
absence  of  well-functioning  governance  mechanisms,  as  the  corporate  governance 
literature  argues,  managers  may  expropriate  investors’  funds,  engage  in  empire 
building, or simply live an easy life (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Among various 
corporate  governance  mechanisms  that  ensure  managerial  discipline,  the  managerial 
labor market plays a key role. In particular, performance-based compensation schemes 
stimulate  managers  to  maximize  profit  and  shareholder  value,  while  the  threat  of 
dismissal prevents them from shirking and/or engaging in expropriation of investors’ 
funds. 
It is widely acknowledged that the corporate governance problem has had an 
extra dimension in transition countries.  During the socialist period, managers of state 
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enterprises  were  appointed  for  their  adherence  to  the  state-supported  ideology  or 
because  they  were  proficient  in  lobbying  the  government  for  credits  and  securing 
delivery of inputs (e.g., Shleifer and Vasiliev, 1996). In the 1990s, most of these skills 
became of  little  or  no  value  and incompetence of  many managers  in  the  emerging 
market environment became apparent. In other words, the countries of Eastern Europe 
entered the transition period with considerable mismatch between managerial talent and 
productive assets (e.g.,  Roland, 2000). The lack of ability on the part of the existing 
managers,  and  their  entrenchment,  raised  concerns  whether  introducing  appropriate 
incentives would have any positive effect on enterprise restructuring and performance. 
It might well be the case that the governance problems could not be resolved without 
replacing the incumbent pre-privatization managers in the first place (e.g., Fidrmuc and 
Fidrmuc, 2006). 
These factors explain recent interest among both academics and policy-makes in 
the functioning of the managerial labor market in transition countries. Managerial pay 
and performance, factors triggering dismissal of incumbents and those leading to the 
appointments of inside versus outside successors, as well as the effect of managerial 
turnover on enterprise performance are among the topics that have stayed high on the 
research agenda in the region. The empirical research remains, however, hampered by 
the limited availability of data, apart from a few relatively well-studied countries such 
as the Czech Republic and Russia (e.g., Claessens and Djankov, 1999;  Fidrmuc and 
Fidrmuc, 2005; Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, 2007; Muravyev, 2003a; Kapelyushnikov and 
Demina, 2005). 
Our paper focuses on corporate governance in Ukraine, a transition country that, 
despite recent scholarly interest, remains relatively poorly studied by economists. The 
country occupies a particular position among transition economies. It is the only state in 
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the Eastern European region that has experienced a prolonged decline from 1991 to 
1999, with GDP falling by nearly 60 percent (e.g., EBRD 2001). It is also among the 
countries that introduced very few reforms in the course of the 1990s. In particular, 
Ukraine is known for slow, convoluted and politicized privatization (e.g.,  Estrin and 
Rosevear, 2003). Also, a sound legal framework regulating the creation and operation of 
corporations – the core of the modern economies – was established in Ukraine only in 
2008, with the adoption of the Law on Joint-Stock Companies. Before that, the legal 
basis consisted of largely outdated acts (e.g., the Law on Economic Associations) that 
were adopted in 1991, when the country was still a part of the USSR. The weak legal 
framework, combined with ineffective enforcement of law (e.g.,  Pistor et al.,  2000), 
raised considerable concerns about the quality of corporate governance in the country. 
Indeed, as suggested by Schnytzer and Andreyeva (2002), Ukrainian firms in 1998 still 
behaved as if they were “… in a loosely reformed Soviet environment where exchange 
via  interpersonal  connections,  rather  than  the  price  mechanism,  determined  the 
allocation of resources.”  
In this paper we take a look at a particular aspect of corporate governance in 
Ukraine, the sensitivity of managerial turnover to the past performance of firms. Such 
an  analysis  can  be  regarded  as  a  crude  test  of  the  overall  efficiency  of  corporate 
governance  in  the  country  (e.g.,  Gibson,  2003).  Indeed,  an  effective  corporate 
governance  system  requires  that  badly  performing  incumbents  are  systematically 
replaced by new, more skilled and better motivated, managers. In addition, we examine 
how  managerial  turnover  is  related  to  several  other  factors,  such  as  managerial 
ownership,  supervisory  board  size,  leverage,  and  liquidity  of  firms.  The  role  of 
corporate boards is of particular importance as regulations concerning board size and 
the exact distribution of power between corporate boards and shareholders’ meetings 
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have  been  a  subject  of  intense  debates  among  academics,  policy-makers,  and 
practitioners. 
Using a new dataset on Ukrainian joint-stock companies, which we assemble 
from companies’ reports to the regulator, State Commission on Securities and the Stock 
Market,  we  find  evidence  of  an  inverse  relationship  between  past  performance  of 
companies and the likelihood of managerial turnover. This result is robust to controlling 
for a number of important factors, such as firm size, leverage, liquidity, supervisory 
board size, as well as important characteristics of chief executives, such as experience 
and gender.  We also  find that  higher  managerial  ownership  reduces  CEO turnover, 
indicating  entrenchment  effects.  However,  there  is  no  evidence  in  the  data  that 
managerial ownership affects the strength of the turnover-performance relationship. The 
same  is  true  of  the  size  of  supervisory  boards.  Overall,  our  analysis  suggests  that 
Ukraine passes the crude test of the efficiency of corporate governance, despite all the 
institutional weaknesses accompanying the country’s transition process. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of 
the  literature  on  managerial  turnover  –  performance  relationship,  with  a  particular 
emphasis on the Eastern European region. The data and sample are described in Section 
3.  Section 4 discusses the methodological  approach adopted in the study. Section 5 
presents main results of the empirical analysis.  Section 6 concludes.    
2. Literature review
There is an extensive literature on the managerial labor market (and the relationship 
between  managerial  performance  and  turnover  in  particular)  that  dates  back  to  the 
1980s (e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990). These and other studies have established an inverse relationship 
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between the likelihood of managerial turnover and corporate performance in a number 
of developed economies, most notably the US and the UK. Further research shows that 
the  performance-turnover  relationship  is  influenced  by  board  size  (e.g.,  Yermack. 
1996),  board  composition  (e.g.,  Weisbach,  1988),  and  ownership  (e.g.,  Kang  and 
Shivdasani,  1995).  Dismissals  of  CEOs  are  found  to  be  associated  with  positive 
abnormal stock performance (e.g., Dennis and Dennis, 1995), especially when outside 
successors are appointed as new managers (e.g., Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997). 
Summarizing the available evidence, Djankov and Murrell (2002) suggest that 
managerial turnover is almost always effective in improving enterprise performance in 
Western countries. As regards transition and emerging economies, the picture is less 
clear-cut as many institutions of corporate governance remain underdeveloped in these 
countries. Indeed, a clear link between enterprise performance and managerial turnover 
may  not  exist  in  transition  countries  due  to  the  imperfections  in  the  protection  of 
property  rights,  underdevelopment  of  the  financial  market,  as  well  as  due  to  the 
intervention by the state (e.g.,  Muravyev, 2003b). How the managerial labor market 
operates in these economies remains, therefore, an interesting and important empirical 
question (e.g., Gibson, 2003).
Despite a rapid expansion in recent years, the relevant literature remains scarce. 
There is some evidence suggesting the importance of new managerial human capital for 
enterprise restructuring and improved performance in transition countries. One of the 
early studies of the impact of managerial turnover on corporate performance is that by 
Barberis et al. (1996). Using a survey of 452 Russian privatized shops, they find that the 
presence of  new management  matters  for  restructuring,  which is  measured by shop 
renovations,  supplier  changes,  store  hours  increases,  and  layoffs.  Claessens  and 
Djankov (1999) report for the Czech Republic that the appointment of new managers in 
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1993-1997  is  associated  with  improvements  in  corporate  performance  measured  by 
profit margins and labor productivity. The result is particularly strong if new managers 
are  selected  by  private  owners  rather  than  government  officials.  The  finding  that 
replacing a CEO in a newly privatized firm improves firm performance in the Czech 
Republic is confirmed in Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2007).
Another strand of literature looks at the relationship between past performance 
of firms and the likelihood of senior management turnover. For example, Gibson (2003) 
focuses on the link between corporate performance and CEO turnover using a sample of 
over 1,200 non-financial firms in eight emerging markets (Brazil, Chile, India, Korea, 
Malaysia,  Mexico,  Taiwan,  and  Thailand).  He  finds  that  the  probability  of  CEO 
turnover  rises  with  poor  performance  of  firms,  which  suggests  that  corporate 
governance in the selected emerging markets is not ineffective. Gibson also finds that 
the  presence  of  a  large  domestic  private  shareholder  does  not  improve  corporate 
governance.  
Eriksson (2005) provides some evidence that poor corporate performance in the 
Czech Republic  and Slovakia results  in  a  higher  likelihood of  managerial  turnover. 
Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2007) report a similar  relationship for Czech firms,  but only 
three to four years after their privatization. Muravyev (2003a) studies determinants of 
CEO turnover using a sample of over 400 privatized firms in Russia. Past performance 
measured  by  labor  productivity  is  found  to  be  an  important  factor  triggering  CEO 
replacement in underperforming firms. Furthermore, outside ownership, smaller size of 
corporate boards, control changes, and financial constraints are associated with higher 
rates  of  managerial  turnover.  Similar  results  are  reported  by  Kapelyushnikov  and 
Demina  (2005),  who identify  three  main determinants  influencing  CEO turnover  in 
Russia: ownership structure, control changes, and financial performance. Interestingly, 
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Kapelyushnikov  and  Demina  (2005)  find  that  outside  succession  is  driven  by  poor 
performance  while  Muravyev  (2003b)  suggests  a  higher  probability  of  outside 
succession in firms with a higher return on equity.
An  important  issue  in  most  of  these  studies  of  the  effect  of  past  corporate 
performance of firms on the likelihood of managerial turnover is the distinction between 
voluntary  departures  and  forced  resignations  of  managers  (e.g.,  Hermalin  and 
Weisbach,  2003).  Distinguishing  between  the  different  reasons  for  CEO  change  is 
indeed  problematic,  and  many  studies  disregard  these  differences  due  to  the 
unavailability  of  relevant  information.  The argument  in  favour  of  the approach that 
ignores the differences is that when a negative performance-turnover link is detected in 
the  overall  sample  (e.g.,  covering  routine  turnover,  voluntary  leaves,  and  forced 
resignations), it is still likely to be driven by firing for poor performance. In particular, 
routine turnover is hardly related to performance; and it is far from obvious why poor 
performance should trigger voluntary departures of CEOs. It may be argued that poorly 
performing  managers  are  likely  to  be  willing  to  stay  rather  than  leave  their  firms 
because their outside options are bad.  Therefore, the only problem with the approach 
that pools all types of separations together is that the negative performance-turnover 
relationship becomes more difficult to establish. It may simply be not found if the bulk 
of all separations are routine or voluntary. Overall, there seems to be a consensus in the 
literature that a negative performance-turnover relationship reflects boards firing CEOs 
(e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). 
Nevertheless,  few attempts  to  distinguish  between  different  reasons  of  CEO 
replacement are known in the literature. For example, Rachinsky (2002) uses publicly 
available information on large companies to study managerial turnover in the context of 
the  transition  economy  of  Russia  and  finds  that  most  separations  are  actually  not 
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dismissals.  However,  as  acknowledged  in  the  mentioned  study,  different  types  of 
turnover can overlap (even in the case of firing for poor performance, the officially 
announced reason for turnover is often neutral: health conditions, expiration of contract, 
etc.) and therefore the classification of turnover cases is far from objective.
As  regards  Ukraine,  the  evidence  concerning  the  performance  –  turnover 
relationship is limited. The study by Warzinski (2003) is a notable exception in this 
respect. Based on survey data covering 300 Ukrainian firms, it analyzes determinants 
and  consequences  of  managerial  change,  as  well  as  the  role  of  privatization  and 
competition in improving company performance. Warzinski finds some evidence  that 
financial difficulties in private, though not state, firms results in higher probability of 
CEO departure. The study also suggests that managerial change and privatization have a 
positive  joint  effect  on  profitability,  though  the  individual  effects  appear  to  be 
insignificant.
Warzinski’s study has several weaknesses stemming largely from the nature and 
quality of the data. First,  the sample size is relatively small.  Moreover, the data are 
obtained  in  two  Ukrainian  regions  only.  More  importantly,  the  study  does  not  use 
accounting information – performance is measured based on qualitative assessments of 
respondents, who are asked if their firms faced financial difficulties shortly before the 
interviews.  The  reliability  of  such  subjective  data  on  company  performance  raises 
substantial concerns about the main findings of the study.
We conclude that the evidence concerning the relationship between corporate 
performance  and  managerial  turnover,  and  the  overall  effectiveness  of  corporate 
governance, remains scarce for Ukraine. Our paper contributes to filling in this gap.
3. Data and sample description 
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In  our  empirical  analysis,  we  take  advantage  of  a  recently  established  database  of 
Ukrainian  joint-stock  companies,  which  is  maintained  by  State  Commission  on 
Securities  and  the  Stock  Market,  the  country’s  regulator.  The  Commission  collects 
essential information about companies and makes it publicly available on its website.1 
The database covers over 7,000 firms, with the earliest records available in 2001. The 
data  contain  detailed  financial  information  about  firms  (annual  balance  sheets  and 
income statements), information on their ownership and governance structures, industry 
affiliation,  number of employees,  location,  etc.  There is also a bunch of data about 
firms’  chief  executives,  including  names,  gender,  and  tenure  on  the  managerial 
positions.  
The estimation sample for our empirical analysis is constructed from these data 
in several steps. First, we restrict the sample to open joint-stock companies, dropping all 
observations pertaining to closed joint-stock firms. One reason for such a decision is 
restrictions  on  transferability  of  shares  in  closed  corporations,  which  may  have 
implications for  managerial  turnover.2 More importantly,  the disclosure standard for 
closed  joint-stock  companies  is  somewhat  more  lax  than  for  open  corporations, 
resulting in the unavailability of essential data about the former type of firms. Second, 
because we want to relate changes in CEOs between the current and preceding periods 
to companies’ performance in the preceding period, we only keep observations with 
complete  data in the current  and preceding financial  years.  Constructed along these 
lines, our final sample includes 916 companies with a total of 3,934 observations over a 
5-year period from 2002 to 2006. 
In the process of data collection, we attempted to trace exact reasons for changes 
1 The Internet address is www.smida.gov.ua, the link effective as of May 2008.
2 Comparing open and closed joint-stock companies is an interesting research topic that is outside of the 
scope of this paper.
12
in CEOs in Ukrainian firms.  In doing so, we have been looking at publicly available 
data sources about Ukrainian companies, such as State Commission on Securities and 
Stock  Market’s  disclosure  server (http://smida.gov.ua),  corporate  sites, and  various 
mass  media,  most  notably  Interfax  News  Agency  (http://interfax.com.ua).  The 
importance of mass media in covering corporate news has grown considerably in recent 
years, with many cases of changes in management receiving high publicity. 
A complete classification of nearly half a thousand cases of changes in CEOs 
that we observe in the data has proved to be a virtually impossible task, however. The 
principal reason for that is the unavailability of relevant information from earlier years 
and for smaller  firms,  as well  as  ambiguous and contradictory information in many 
other instances. Nevertheless, we have identified a couple of dozen cases of routine 
turnover of managers (due to death, health reasons, and retirement because of pension 
age), changes in CEOs due to bankruptcy of firms, as well as a number of cases linked 
to the political process, including cabinet changes. The latter is not a surprise in view of 
abundant evidence of important role of political factors in the Ukrainian economy (e.g., 
Baum et al. 2008). 
In particular, we have found several instances of politically-motivated changes 
in CEOs in firms with considerable government ownership – “strategic” enterprises, 
especially  among  the  power  utilities  and  in  the  metallurgical  sector.  For  example, 
managerial change in “Chornomornaftogas” in 2006 caused a stir as it clearly revealed 
government officials’ fight for a particularly attractive company. Interestingly, despite 
wide  coverage  of  the  case  in  mass  media,  the  officially  announced  reason  for 
managerial change was the expiration of the departing CEO’s contract. This example 
illustrates  the  tremendous  difficulties  in  identifying  the  true  reasons  for  managerial 
turnover in Ukraine.
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Given  these  difficulties,  we  stay  short  of  providing  more  details  about  the 
reasons underlying turnover of CEOs in Ukrainian firms. Even though we are able to 
exclude 22 admittedly routine changes in CEOs from the final estimation sample, our 
paper essentially follows the standard approach in the literature that does not draw a 
distinction between different types of separations (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). 
4. Methodology
4.1. Performance measures
Choosing  an  indicator  that  would  reliably  capture  all  essential  aspects  of  company 
performance  is  a  non-trivial  task  in  developed  economies,  and  even  more  so  in 
transition and developing countries. For example, Bevan et al. (1999) suggest that poor 
accounting  standards  and  the  underdevelopment  of  stock  markets  force  researchers 
studying  enterprise  performance  in  transition  economies  to  place  less  emphasis  on 
indicators that are based on capital stock, assets, or equity. 
In particular, the use of Tobin’s Q, a traditional measure of the expected long-
run performance of firms, is virtually ruled out in the transition context because of the 
absence, or a very limited role, of stock markets. There are also problems associated 
with the use of total factor productivity owing to low reliability of the capital stock data. 
Imprecise estimates of capital coupled with endogeneity of profit plague profitability 
ratios, such as return on equity.3 
These difficulties lead researchers studying enterprise performance in emerging 
and transition  countries  to  adopt  indicators  that  are  less  common in  the  context  of 
developed economies. For example, Bevan et al. (1999) consider the share of exports in 
sales to be a particularly useful indicator of enterprise performance in the transition 
3 The biggest concern is profit if measured net of taxes because taxes are often viewed as endogenous 
rather than parametric (Schaffer, 1998).
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environment. Gibson (2003) uses accounting measures of performance such as earnings 
before interest  and taxes  scaled by assets,  the  change in  earnings  scaled by lagged 
assets, and growth in sales. The study by Warzinski (2003) employs a rather peculiar 
performance measure, a dummy that indicates if a firm faced financial difficulties in the 
preceding period,  according to  managers’  subjective  responses  while  Barberis  et  al. 
(1996) consider a bunch of restructuring indices, such as shop renovations. A number of 
scholars  choose  labor  productivity  as  the  most  suitable  performance  measure  (e.g., 
Earle, 1998; Kouznetsov and Muravyev, 2001); however, this measure is appropriate 
for short-term analysis only,  as it is based on the implicit assumption that the level of 
capital remains unchanged.
Understanding the pros and cons of various measures of firm performance, as well 
as potential differences in their interpretation, we opt for using several indicators instead 
of  choosing  and  defending  a  single  one.  In  particular,  our  focus  will  be  on  labor 
productivity  (LP),  return  on  sales  (ROS),  and  return  on  assets  (ROA).  This  list 
deliberately  omits  return  on  equity  (ROE),  one  of  the  measures  that  can  easily  be 
computed from the data. Such an omission is not an accident. In the data we have, there 
are more than 100 firms having negative equity,  according to their  balance sheets.4 
Thus, in case such a firm reports losses in the last financial year, one obtains a positive 
value of ROE from the division of one negative number (financial loss) by another one 
(negative equity). Clearly, the calculated positive value has nothing to do with the actual 
performance of the firm. While there are credible concerns about the other measures of 
performance,  including labor  productivity,  return on sales,  and return on assets,  we 
believe that the magnitude of possible accounting distortions is much smaller in these 
cases. 
4 This is typical in an inflationary environment when firms that do not regularly revalue their fixed assets 
incur considerable losses.
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4.2. Econometric models
The focus of this study is the link between CEO turnover on the one hand and firm 
performance  on  the  other.  The  outcome  in  our  analysis  can  be  represented  by  a 
dichotomous  variable  which  equals  to  one  in  case  of  CEO  dismissal  between  two 
adjacent years and zero otherwise. Because of the binary outcome variable, we use the 
logit model to estimate the following CEO turnover equation:
Cit= Λ (α+β*Performancet-1+X it-1γ)                          (1)
where i indexes firms, t corresponds to period, Cit is a dummy variable for a change in 
CEO between years t-1 and t, Performancet-1 is a measure of firm performance in period 
t-1, Xit-1 is a vector of control variables that characterize firms and their managers, and Λ 
is the cumulative density function of the logistic distribution. The parameter of interest 
is β, which we expect to be negative. 
Based on previous studies of determinants of managerial turnover, we include 
the following characteristics of firms and their managers in vector X: 
• a variable measuring the size of a company’s supervisory board, the organ that is 
empowered to monitor managers and fire them in case of poor performance. The 
optimal size of the board has been subject of controversy in the literature (e.g., 
Jensen,  1993).  Board size has been found an important  determinant  of CEO 
change in Yermack (1996), Borokhovich et al. (1996), and Huson et al. (2001). 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) provide an extended list of studies documenting 
a negative relationship between board size and corporate performance in their 
survey of corporate boards in developed economies. 
• measures of leverage and liquidity,  which are supposed to control for firms’ 
financial  constraints. High leverage and/or low liquidity are likely to rise the 
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probability of bankruptcy and the threat of bankruptcy may cause higher CEO 
turnover.
• firm size (measured by the natural logarithm of total assets or by the natural 
logarithm of employment).  This variable is highly relevant in our analysis as 
larger  firms  may  have  a  bigger  pool  of  internal  successors  for  a  departing 
manager so that these firms face smaller costs of finding a new CEO.
• chief  executives’  ownership  stakes.  We  expect  that  managerial  ownership 
inhibits managerial turnover by promoting, ceteris paribus, entrenchment of the 
incumbents.5 
• the gender of managers. There is a growing attention in the corporate finance 
literature to  gender composition of corporate  boards and the gender  of  chief 
executives (e.g., Rose, 2007; Francoeur et. al., 2008). The interest is sparked by 
the  existence  of  differences  between  men  and  women,  for  example,  in  risk 
aversion, which may translate into different behavior as directors and managers 
(e.g.,  Schubert  et.  al.,  1999;  Stelter,  2002).  We hypothesize that boards may 
have  a  gender  bias  in  evaluating  CEO performance  and  therefore  include  a 
dummy variable indicating CEOs’ gender in our econometric model. 
• managerial experience (number of years of work on managerial positions) and 
age. Managers’ experience is another important variable in our analysis that may 
help shed more light on the role of managerial human capital. On the one hand, 
managerial  experience,  which  characterizes  accumulation  of  professional 
knowledge and acquisition of managerial techniques, may be a valuable asset to 
the  firm.  On the  other  hand,  greater  managerial  experience,  ceteris  paribus, 
5 It  is  worth  noting  that  managerial  ownership  may  be  positively  associated  with  performance  as 
managers  have  stronger  incentives  to  exert  effort  when  their  ownership  stake  is  larger  (Jensen  and 
Meckling, 1976). This incentive effect of managerial ownership works in the opposite direction to the 
entrenchment effect. 
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implies  older  managers  who  may have  insufficient  ability  to  run  firms  in  a 
market environment if much of their skills were acquired in the Soviet time. We 
include  both  managerial  age  and  experience  in  our  regressions  in  order  to 
separate these effects.
• industry and region fixed effects represented by a set of dummy variables.6 
A  potentially  interesting  extension  of  the  baseline  analysis  comes  from 
augmenting the econometric model with interactions of performance with a number of 
control  variables  comprising  vector  X.  Such  an  extension  provides  evidence  as  to 
whether  the  strength  of  the  performance-turnover  relationship  varies  with  different 
characteristics of firms, most notable  ownership and board size.7 We conduct such an 
analysis interacting performance with managerial ownership, board size, and industry 
affiliation of firms.  
In addition to the baseline specification (1), we model managerial turnover as a 
time-dependent event using hazard models that explicitly take into account the timing of 
changes in CEOs.  Following Geddes and Hrishikesh (1997), the determinants of CEO 
tenure are estimated using the following proportional hazard model specification:
L(t|X) =L0 (t)exp(Xb)                                                                               (2)
where L(t) is the base-line hazard,  t is the duration of a manager’s life in the company, 
X is a vector of explanatory variables and  b is a vector of unknown parameters to be 
estimated. The most common methods for estimating hazard models with time varying 
covariates are the discrete time and Cox proportional Hazard models. Shumway (2001) 
showed that  they produce similar results,  but  the former method is  computationally 
more efficient.
6 Industry affiliation may affect the cost of replacing CEOs as it is related to the ease of finding an outside 
successor. If a company belongs to an industry consisting of very heterogeneous firms, finding an outside 
successor may be difficult as many potential candidates may not possess adequate (firm-)specific human 
capital.
7 For example, entrenchment of managers, which is facilitated by managerial ownership, may become a 
particularly severe problem when it comes along with managerial incompetence.
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As we want to capture the degree of tolerance, a spell could be defined as a 
period without CEO turnover. Since we have one exit from the spell, we estimate this 
model using the complementary log-log regression.8 The dependent variable is equal to 
one for the last period a CEO worked in the company and zero otherwise.
To capture the "patience" effects  we employ a fully non-parametric  baseline 
hazard function. We do this by defining dummy variables which correspond to the spell 
duration. For example, if the maximum survival time is four, we will have three dummy 
variables.
5. Regression results
5.1. Logit model
To  estimate  the  effect  of  firm  performance  on  CEO  turnover  we  employ  five 
specifications that differ in terms of performance indicators and control variables used. 
The dependent variable in all  regressions is binary variable CHANGE that indicates 
CEO turnover  between  the  current  and  preceding  periods.  As  discussed  above,  our 
analysis focuses on three measures of performance: return on assets (ROA), which is the 
ratio of net profit to assets, return on sales (ROS), which is the ratio of net profit to 
sales, and labor productivity (LP), which is the ratio of sales to the number of workers 
employed.
In  addition  to  the  main  regressor,  which  measures  firm  performance,  our 
econometric models include several other characteristics of firms and of their managers. 
Financial constraints facing the firms are approximated with leverage (LEVERAGE), 
which is the ratio of short-term and long-term debt to assets (in fact, debt-to-equity ratio 
is inappropriate because of the above-discussed problems with measurement of equity). 
88 The complementary log-log regression estimates the probability that an event happens to an individual 
in some time interval, given that the individual did not face this event in earlier periods. The logit model 
for such a continuous-time process is not plausible.
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Liquidity (LIQUIDITY) is measured as the ratio of working capital to short-term debt. 
Since  we expect  to  find  a  negative  relationship  between CEO turnover  and  lagged 
performance of firms, we use lagged values of ROA, ROS, and labor productivity, as 
well as of financial constraints, in the regressions. 
Firm size is proxied by either the natural logarithm of assets (SIZE) or the natural 
logarithm of employment (SIZE_LABOR). Variable EXPERIENCE is measured as the 
number of years of work record on managerial positions, and variable BOARD captures 
the number of directors in the supervisory board. The regressions also include variable 
FEMALE, which is a dummy for the CEO’s gender.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Rather  surprisingly,  Ukrainian  joint  stock  companies  appear  to  be,  on  average, 
unprofitable, as the mean values of ROA and ROS are negative. The other financial 
ratios show that firms are, on average, financially stable. In particular, the ratio of debt-
to-equity is 1:2, and firms’ current liabilities are covered by working capital more than 
three times.  As regards chief executives, they are, on average, 50 years old and have 18 
years of experience. Supervisory boards consist of three to four members on average. 
We also compare summary statistics for two groups of firms: those that have not 
changed their CEOs during the whole period under study and those that have changed 
their managers at least once. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for both types of firms. 
It turns out that firms with no change in CEO are more frequently headed by executives 
who are males and who are also older and more experienced compared with managers 
of firms in the complimentary group. In particular, the mean experience of managers is 
19 years in the former group and only 16 years in the latter group. 
 Managerial turnover is more typical of larger firms, which also have somewhat 
larger supervisory boards. Firms that experience no change in managers have higher 
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liquidity, return on sales and return on assets, and also appear to be less leveraged. In 
other  words,  the  reported  financial  indicators  suggest  a  link  between  financial  risk 
facing companies and managerial turnover. In particular, managers of high-leveraged 
firms are more likely to lose their jobs even though these firms may be more profitable, 
as the corporate finance literature suggests. 
Overall,  the  univariate  analysis  reveals  substantial  differences  in  the 
characteristics  of  the  two  groups  of  firms.  A  multivariate  regression  analysis  that 
follows will help to understand the interplay between these various factors and the main 
outcome of interest, CEO turnover.  
Our baseline regression results are reported in Table 3. Columns (1), (2) and (3) 
show the estimation results for specifications with firm size measured by the natural 
logarithm of assets, and columns (4) and (5) by the natural logarithm of employment. 
The indicators of firm performance are ROA in columns (1) and (4), ROS in columns 
(2) and (5), and labor productivity (LP) in column (3). 
The estimates obtained are in line with our predictions. Managerial turnover is 
negatively and statistically significantly related to firm performance measured by ROS, 
and especially ROA. In particular, an increase in ROA by three standard deviations 
reduces  the  likelihood  of  CEO turnover  by  about  6% (see  columns  1  and 4).  The 
negative  correlation  between ROS and managerial  turnover  is  observed  only in  the 
specification with firm size measured by the number of employees. A change in ROS 
has a much smaller impact on CEO turnover than a similar change in ROA. In contrast 
to these performance indicators, labor productivity appears to have no statistically and 
economically significant effects on CEO turnover. Overall, the results are similar to the 
findings by Muravyev (2003a) and Kapelyushnikov and Demina (2005) for Russia and 
suggest  a  certain  degree  of  effectiveness  of  corporate  governance  in  Ukrainian 
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companies.  In  contrast  to  these  earlier  studies,  our  results  show  a  greater  role  of 
financial indicators in triggering CEO turnover.
Table 3 also shows a number of interesting results related to the role of firms’ 
financial  constraints.  For example,  leverage has a significant positive impact on the 
probability of CEO turnover in all five specifications. This is consistent with Jensen 
(1989),  who  regards  leverage  as  a  crucial  constraint  on  managerial  discretion.  In 
contrast, liquidity has no statistically or economically significant effect on CEO change. 
The regression results do not show any statistically or economically significant 
effect of supervisory board size on the probability of CEO turnover. This is a somewhat 
puzzling result. Studies from other countries suggest an important role of board size and 
composition  in  monitoring  and  replacing  CEOs,  according  to  the  survey  article  by 
Hermalin  and  Weisbach  (2003).  We,  however,  find  that  larger  companies,  ceteris 
paribus, are more likely to experience a change in CEO, regardless of how we measure 
firm size. 
As regards characteristics of managers such as gender and experience, they appear 
to have no effect on CEO turnover in Ukrainian firms. However, managerial ownership 
has  negative  and  statistically  significant  effect  on  the  probability  of  turnover.  An 
increase  in  the  equity  stake  of  the  manager  by  1%  reduces  the  probability  of  her 
dismissal  by  0.3%.  Our  study  thus  confirms  the  adverse  role  of  managerial 
entrenchment, long suggested in the corporate governance literature.   
We also test whether the strengths of the performance-turnover relationship varies 
with supervisory board size and CEO share ownership. With this purpose, we introduce 
interaction terms between these characteristics and firm performance. Interestingly, the 
coefficients  of  these  interactions  turn  out  to  be  statistically  insignificant.  The 
coefficients on the other variables remain pretty similar to those reported in the baseline 
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regressions.9 
We also investigate the link between CEO turnover and the relative performance 
of companies (that is, relative to other firms in the same industry). The idea is that such 
a  relative  measure  is  a  better  indicator  of  the  quality  of  management  than  firm 
performance per se.  Indeed, company performance is subject to various shocks, which 
may have nothing to do with managerial decisions. For example, poor performance of a 
particular company may be a consequence of a decline in the whole industry, rather than 
a  result  of  mismanagement.  Thus,  shareholders  and  supervisory  boards  may  place 
stronger emphasis on such a relative evaluation when deciding the future of corporate 
executives.10 
In this study, relative performance is measured as the difference between the 
company’s performance indicator and the average performance in the relevant industry, 
distinguished by two-digit industry codes. The regression results for the standard logit 
specifications are shown in Table 4. In general, they are pretty similar to the previous 
estimates. The main result is that poor relative performance of a company in terms of 
relative ROA triggers CEO change, while the other measures of relative performance do 
not appear to be strong signals for the dismissal of managers.   
Another interesting issue is whether firm performance has differential impacts 
on CEO turnover in different industries. We check this by interacting firm performance 
with industry dummies. The results from estimating the five familiar specifications are 
reported in Table 5. Note that of all industry-performance interactions, the table shows 
only those with statistically significant coefficients. There are a number of interesting 
results.  The  negative  effect  of  ROA  on  managerial  turnover  is  observed  in  the 
9 These results are not reported in the paper, but are available on request from the authors.
10 For a detailed discussion of relative performance evaluation, see for example, Holmstrom (1982) and 
Parrino (1997).
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construction  materials  and  construction  industries.  ROS  has  a  strong  impact  on 
managerial dismissal in the food processing, textile, construction materials, energy, and 
construction  sectors.  Strong  effects  of  labour  productivity  are  visible  in  the 
metallurgical and electronic tools industries. Of all these industry effects, the strongest 
relationship (from the statistical  viewpoint) is observed in the construction materials 
industry. We believe that this pattern can be explained by a considerable number of 
firms comprising this industry as well as by its considerable homogeneity, implying that 
the performance of a firm provides a better  signal for shareholders and supervisory 
boards  about  the  quality  of  management  than  in  more concentrated  and  less 
homogenous sectors.  
5.2 Survival analysis 
In this  part  of our analysis  we first  define a dummy variable indicating survival  of 
managers and then use it to generate a dependent variable for the hazard model. This 
latter variable takes the value of one in the last period of a CEO’s life in the company 
and  zero  otherwise.  Next,  we  screen  the  data  in  order  to  remove  observations 
corresponding  to  firms  with  no  managerial  turnover  in  2001-2006 as  well  as  firms 
experiencing changes  in  CEO in each consecutive  period.  This  screening procedure 
results in a restricted sample embracing 1,246 firm-year observations. 
Two  further  restrictions  on  the  sample  come  from  the  left-censoring  (no 
information about the exact date a CEO was appointed in the past) and unavailability of 
lagged firm-specific variables. As a result, the final sample for estimating the hazard 
model consists of only 633 firm-year observations. 
Firm-specific  variables  and  variables  characterizing  managers  that  enter  the 
hazard models are constructed in the same manner as in the previous logit analysis. 
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Specifically, the list of regressors includes measures of performance, leverage, liquidity, 
firm size, managerial share ownership, supervisory board size, as well  as managers’ 
gender, age, and experience. Descriptive statistics of these variables for the restricted 
sample of 633 observations are shown in Table 6. We expect these variables to affect 
CEO survival in the same manner as they affect CEO turnover in the logit model. 
The results from estimating the discrete time hazards model (complementary log-
log) are presented in Table 7. It should be noted that the hazard models can be treated 
both semi-parametrically and non-parametrically. In order to obtain consistent estimates 
in case the baseline hazard is poorly specified, we use the latter approach. The baseline 
hazard in columns (1), (2), and (3) therefore consists of the following periods: (i) one, 
(ii) two years, (iii) three years, and (iv) four years inclusive. A positive coefficient on a 
variable indicates its positive contribution to the hazard rate and  a decreased survival 
time of a chief executive. 
According to the estimates shown in Table 7, more experienced CEOs are less 
likely to survive in  the firms.  We also observe negative and statistically  significant 
coefficients on variable LEVERAGE. This result, implying that a higher level of debt is 
associated with a lower likelihood of dismissal, is counterintuitive and contradicts the 
conventional  theory.  The  regressions  do  not  suggest  any  role  of  firm performance, 
supervisory board size, financial constrains measured by liquidity, as well as firm size 
on  survival  time.  In  other  words,  leverage  and  experience  appear  to  be  the  only 
significant factors in the survival models.
One caveat in the survival analysis presented above is a rather short time interval 
during which we observe CEOs holding their posts. The problem stems from the fact 
that we deal with a short panel; it is also exacerbated by missing data on supervisory 
board size and employment in 2001, which leads to the loss of observations from 2000 
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and 2001. The other reason for a dramatic reduction in the number of observations is the 
(necessary) screening procedure, which eliminates firms without CEO turnover during 
the whole period under study as well as firms experiencing changes in CEO during 
consecutive years.  
The data at hand show that many firms with one or two CEO changes are tracked 
during three or four years only. Consequently, managerial histories are not long enough 
to get a sound understanding of the turnover process. Moreover, it can also be the case 
that  firms  without  CEO  turnover,  which  we  had  to  exclude  from  the  sample,  are 
systematically different from the remaining firms. Indeed, the excluded firms may be 
more stable and of better quality in terms of corporate governance, as evidenced by 
regular and punctual submission of reports to the national regulator. Another peculiarity 
of the CEO’s tenure is the observation that the “birth” of a new manager can take place 
in the last period. For instance, even though we are able to track most firms over five 
years, we cannot identify the start date for previous CEOs, who typically had much 
longer tenures compared with incumbents. Thus, the survival analysis faces the problem 
of limited timing, and we believe that the differences between the results obtained from 
the logit model and the hazard model can be attributed to this factor. In other words, the 
results  obtained  from different  specifications  of  the  logit  model  appear  to  be  more 
reliable than those from the hazard model.
6. Conclusions
This paper studies the relationship between managerial turnover and firm performance 
in Ukraine. We use a new sample of open joint-stock companies that operated in the 
country in 2002-2006, a period of robust economic growth and intensive restructuring. 
Our analysis is based on several specifications of the standard logit model, as well as on 
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the discrete time hazard model.  In order to mitigate distortions in measures of firm 
performance,  which  stem  from  deficient  accounting  practices,  we  use  multiple 
indicators of performance: ROA, ROS, and labor productivity. In addition, we measure 
performance of a firm relative to other firms in the same industry, which may be a better 
indicator of managerial effort in the firm.
Our main result is the presence of a negative relationship between the likelihood 
of CEO dismissal and firm performance, especially if the latter is measured by return on 
assets. This suggests that corporate governance in Ukraine shows a certain degree of 
efficiency. We also find that larger ownership by managers reduces the likelihood of 
managerial turnover. The size of supervisory boards appears to play no significant role 
in CEO turnover. Interestingly, Ukrainian managers are financially constrained in their 
activities:  the probability of a CEO’s departure turns out to be related to the firm’s 
leverage. We do not observe any significant effect of liquidity, however.  The inclusion 
of interaction terms between performance measures on the one hand and supervisory 
board size and managerial ownership on the other hand does not provide any additional 
insight into the functioning of Ukraine’s managerial labor market. 
Our results are of particular interest in view of the ongoing changes in Ukrainian 
corporate  law,  and  in  particular,  the  recent  enactment  of  Law  on  Joint-Stock 
Companies. According to the regulations that existed before the adoption of the new 
law, the right to dismiss executives belonged exclusively to the shareholder’s meeting. 
Supervisory boards, while having some authority to initiate management changes, had 
rather limited power in deciding the future of CEOs. The new law changes the balance 
of  power  in  favour  of  supervisory  boards.  It  also  establishes  a  minimum  size  of 
supervisory boards. The proponents of these changes argue that they would produce 
more efficient response to poor performance of managers. Whether such a redistribution 
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of power within the firm leads to better monitoring of managers and improves corporate 
performance may be an interesting topic for future research.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the sample used in the logit regressions.
Variable Definition Mean Standard Deviation
CHANGE Equals one if change take place in this period 0.102 0.302
FEMALE Equals one if female 0.090 0.287
EXPERIENCE Number of years of experience on executive position 18.245 9.809
AGE CEO age 50.319 8.876
BOARD Number of members in the supervisory board 3.483 1.737
SHARE The share ownership of CEO 11.733 18.557
LEVERAGE The ratio of debts to assets 0.327 0.279
LIQUIDITY The ratio of working capital to short-term debts 3.379 4.593
SIZE Log of firm’s assets 8.720 1.582
Assets Firm’s assets in 1,000 UAH 26,899.68 69,153.21
SIZE_LABOR Log of employed 4.900 1.259
Employment Number of people employed 319.506 559.583
ROA The ratio of net profit to assets -0.009 0.089
ROS The ratio of net profit to sales -0.054 0.183
LP The ratio of sales to the number of employed 62.343 78.403
BOARD*ROA Interaction of board size and ROA -0.032 0.308
BOARD*ROS Interaction of board size and ROS -0.180 0.633
BOARD*LP Interaction of board size and LP 212.966 291.815
SHARE*ROA Interaction of share ownership of CEO and ROA -0.015 1.236
SHARE *ROS Interaction of share ownership of CEO and ROS -0.239 1.709
SHARE *LP Interaction of share ownership of CEO and LP 556.198 1151.805
Note: Descriptive statistics are based on 3,012 observations.
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 Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables, by CEO turnover.
Firms without CEO turnover 
during the whole period 
under consideration 
(2,004 observations)
Firms with CEO turnover 
during the whole period 
under consideration
(1,008 observations)
t
Variable Mean
Standard 
deviation Mean
Standard 
deviation
FEMALE 0.081 0.273 0.108 0.311 2.423
EXPERIENCE 19.256 9.542 16.234 10.025 -8.064
AGE 51.488 8.370 47.996 9.385 -10.368
BOARD 3.409 1.691 3.632 1.816 3.335
SHARE 15.198 20.519 4.844 10.993 -14.975
LEVERAGE 0.297 0.265 0.388 0.296 8.500
LIQUIDITY 3.617 4.747 2.906 4.233 -4.021
SIZE 8.540 1.461 9.080 1.743 8.957
Assets 19,487.137 55,437.939 41,636.519 88,651.644 8.390
SIZE_LABOR 4.792 1.160 5.114 1.412 6.662
Employment 257.212 453.906 443.354 709.509 8.721
 ROA  0.000 0.085 -0.026 0.093 -7.774
 ROS  -0.042 0.174 -0.078 0.197 -5.122
 LP  56.986 68.852 79.992 93.701 5.312
BOARD*ROA -0.003 0.292 -0.089 0.329 -7.333
BOARD*ROS -0.141 0.605 -0.259 0.679 -4.857
BOARD*LP 188.880 249.833 260.850 356.402 6.403
SHARE*ROA 0.089 1.382 -0.132 0.861 -4.628
SHARE *ROS -0.218 1.849 -0.283 1.390 -0.987
SHARE *LP 700.665 1254.331 268.983 844.496 -9.860
Note: The last column shows the test for the equality of means in two groups of firms.
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 Table 3. Regression results from the logit model.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FEMALE -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
                      (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
EXPERIENCE  -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000 -0.000
                      (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE  -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BOARD 0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001 0.001
                      (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SHARE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEVERAGE 0.038* 0.058*** 0.062*** 0.042** 0.059***
                      (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
LIQUIDITY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE               0.009*** 0.006** 0.006
                      (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ROA                -0.227*** -0.218***
                      (0.055) (0.054)
ROS                -0.031 -0.042*
                      (0.023) (0.024)
LP                -0.000
(0.000)
SIZE_LABOR 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.004)
Number of 
observations 3,017 3,016 3,013 3,013 3,012
Log likelihood -914.405 -920.657 -922.931 -913.802 -919.049
Pseudo R2 0.081 0.072 0.072 0.081 0.074
Note: The dependent variable equals to one if there is CEO turnover in a given year and zero 
otherwise. The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation. Cluster-robust standard 
errors  are  in  brackets.  Marginal  effects  are  estimated around mean points.  The  intercept, 
region and industry dummies are included in the regressions but not reported.  *, **,  *** 
correspond to 10, 5, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
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Table 4. Regression results from the logit model: relative performance measures.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FEMALE -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
                      (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
EXPERIENCE  -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000 -0.000
                      (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE  -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BOARD 0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001 0.001
                      (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SHARE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEVERAGE 0.038* 0.058** 0.061*** 0.042** 0.060***
                      (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
LIQUIDITY 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE               0.009** 0.006 0.006
                      (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ROA _relative -0.227*** -0.217***
                      (0.055) (0.053)
ROS_relative -0.025 -0.026
                      (0.111) (0.109)
LP_relative -0.000
(0.000)
SIZE_LABOR 0.012*** 0.009*
(0.004) (0.005)
Number of 
observations 3,017 3,017 3,013 3,013 3,013
Log likelihood -914.407 -923.081 -922.976 -913.803 -922.111
Pseudo R2 0.081 0.072 0.072 0.081 0.072
Note: The dependent variable equals to one if there is CEO turnover in a given year and zero 
otherwise. The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation. Cluster-robust standard errors 
are in brackets. Marginal effects are estimated around mean points. The intercept, region and 
industry dummies are included in the regressions but not reported. *, **, *** correspond to 10, 5, 
and 1% level of significance, respectively.
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Table 5. Regression results from the logit model: differences across industries.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FEMALE    -0.001    -0.000 -0.004    -0.002   - 0.001
(0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
EXPERIENCE     0.000    -0.000  -0.000    0.000  -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE     -0.000    -0.000  -0.000   -0.000  -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
SHARE     -0.003***    -0.003***  -0.002***   -0.003***  -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BOARD    0.001      0.001     0.001  0.001        0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
LEVERAGE    0.039** 0.052*** 0.044*** 0.044** 0.055***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
LIQUIDITY 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE      0.010***    0.008**    0.006**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
ROA   -0.134 -0.119
(0.083) (0.080)
ROAind6 -0.987** -1.050**
(0.489) (0.486)
ROAind12 -0.931* -0.905*
(0.512) (0.505)
ROS 0.049 0.036
(0.034) (0.035)
ROSind2 -0.926** -0.882**
(0.446) (0.450)
ROSind3 -84.575* -78.012*
(46.754) (46.489)
ROSind6 -0.909*** -0.901**
(0.279) (0.280)
ROSind11 -0.427** -0.406*
  (0.212) (0.211)
ROSind12   -0.984**    -0.946**
(0.392)   (0.392)
LP 0.000
(0.000)
LPind7    6.242***
(0.475)
LPind8 -0.028**
(0.011)
SIZE_LABOR    0.012***    0.011***
(0.004) (0.004)
Number of observations 3,017 3,016 3,013 3,013 3,012
Log likelihood -909.670       -909.568 -914.734 -909.051 -908.630   
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.083 0.080 0.086 0.084
Note: The dependent variable equals to one if there is CEO turnover in a given year and zero otherwise. 
The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation. Cluster-robust standard errors are in brackets. 
Marginal  effects  are  estimated  around mean points.  The intercept,  region  and industry dummies  are 
included in the regressions but not reported. Interactions between performance measures and industry 
dummies are included for all the dummies; however, the table only shows the statistically significant 
ones. Ind2 refers to Food Production, ind3 – Textile, ind6 – Construction Materials, ind7 – Metallurgy, 
ind8 – Electronic Tools, ind11 – Energy, ind12 – Construction. *, **, *** correspond to 10, 5, and 1% 
level of significance, respectively.
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics for the sample used in the survival analysis.
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Number of 
observations
FEMALE 0.126 0.333 633
SHARE 5.301 11.333 633
EXPERIENCE 17.848 10.185 633
AGE 49.730 9.618 633
BOARD 3.588 2.019 633
LEVERAGE 0.370 0.309 633
LIQUIDITY 3.183 4.342 633
SIZE 8.988 1.808 633
Assets 46132.54 113015.8 633
SIZE_LABOR 4.946 1.475 632
Employment 436.536 813.884 633
ROA -0.033 0.100 633
ROS -0.078 0.207 632
LP 82.233 133.199 633
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 Table 7. Cloglog estimates of the survival function.
(1) (2) (3)
FEMALE -0.210 -0.240 -0.240
 (0.449) (0.455) (0.454)
SHARE -0.004 -0.007 -0.003
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.021)
EXPERIENCE 0.053** 0.052** 0.051**
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
AGE -0.020 -0.019 -0.018
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
BOARD 0.001 0.010 0.005
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.086)
LEVERAGE -1.055* -1.091* -1.191**
 (0.586) (0.580) (0.555)
LIQUIDITY 0.002 0.002 0.006
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
SIZE -0.190 -0.187 -0.193
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.119)
ROA 1.344
 (1.277)
ROS 0.574
 (0.568)
LP 0.001
 (0.001)
Number of 
observations 487 632 633
Log likelihood -124.078 -123.801 -124.342
Note:  The  dependent  variable  equals  to  one  in  the  last  period  of  CEO’s  “life”  and  zero 
otherwise.  The  table  reports  the  results  from  the  non-parametrical  complementary  log-log 
model.  Cluster-robust  standard  errors  are  in  brackets.  The  intercept,  region,  industry  and 
“patience” dummies are included in the regressions but not reported. *, **, *** correspond to 
10, 5, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
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